Pitchei Teshuva — 162:6

Others cannot object. See Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 154:23, who writes that from the words of the Ra’am (Responsa, part I, siman 53) it appears that if the synagogue can accommodate them, they are forbidden to separate; and so too is written in Mishpetei Shmuel, siman 41. See also Responsa Radbaz, part III, siman 472, where it is explained that all this applies when they are united as one heart, in which case their praise ascends properly.

However, if there is division of hearts among them and it is impossible to reconcile them, and they are constantly in dispute and quarrel with one another, it is better that each group pray separately; in such a case, neither the established presumption nor ancestral rights apply. This is likewise written in Responsa Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat, siman 12, paragraph 3, regarding that matter, where he alludes to the words of the Radbaz mentioned above.

See also Responsa Be’er Yitzchak, Orach Chaim part I, siman 24, who responded to a rabbi regarding a town that had an established synagogue, from which some individuals recently separated to pray on their own, and now claim a share in the revenues, books, and sacred vessels of the old synagogue. The respondent ruled that they have no claim whatsoever and cannot diminish the rights of the original synagogue. I too agree with this, for it is clear that one may not encroach upon boundaries set by earlier generations.

Even initially, if a minority wishes to build another synagogue in a place where there is an existing one that accommodates everyone, the majority may prevent them from separating, as stated by the Magen Avraham there in the name of the Rosh—that if the synagogue can hold them, they may not separate. Likewise, I found in the work Pachad Yitzchak (letter bet), in the name of several authors, that if the new synagogue would cause harm to the old one, they may prevent its construction משום קפסקת חיותאי (interference with livelihood/support).

Therefore, if a community splits into two due to differences of opinion, all consecrated property is given to the larger group, and even items in the possession of the smaller group are taken and given to the majority. However, if they divided because the place could not accommodate everyone, then according to strict law they should divide the assets proportionally according to the number of men.

Thus it is explicit, as you distinguished, that the case of the Mabit cited by the Magen Avraham—who wrote that if they were compelled to divide for a reason, all consecrated property should be divided—refers specifically to a situation where they had to separate due to necessity, such as lack of space. But if they separated merely due to differences of opinion, they cannot claim a share.

Furthermore, it is established that the townspeople may impose their will on some members, and the majority can compel the minority. Additionally, it seems to me that transferring consecrated property from the majority to the minority may involve a lowering of sanctity, and he elaborates on this point.

He concludes that in this case, not only if at the time of separation the majority could have prevented them—since the synagogue could accommodate all—even if they remained silent then, the minority still cannot claim rights to the consecrated property. Rather, even in the case described by the Radbaz, where some may separate due to lack of harmony, they still cannot claim a share in the consecrated assets.

This is because it is considered as though they entered into partnership for as long as the synagogue exists, like partners who joined together when they were on good terms and later quarreled—can they then dissolve the partnership? Therefore, the right remains with the majority. See there, and also Responsa Chatam Sofer, ibid., paragraph 4.

See further in Magen Avraham there, who cites Kenesset HaGedolah that the community may decree that people should not pray in a quorum outside the synagogue, both because the gentiles might think they are numerous, and because of individuals who avoid paying taxes yet pray elsewhere in a quorum. See also Responsa Shev Yaakov, Choshen Mishpat siman 25, who was asked about a public proclamation in a certain city, issued by the Av Beit Din together with community leaders, that no one should hold a minyan at home but all should go to the synagogue.

The proclamation allowed exceptions only for Saturday night and festival evenings, and stated that anyone who violated it by holding a minyan at home would incur a fixed fine. Later, someone transgressed and held a minyan due to compulsion and inability to go to the synagogue. The question was whether he is liable for the fine, and if he held a minyan at home multiple times, whether he must pay the fine for each occurrence or only once.

He answered that it is obvious the proclamation applied only to one who is able to go to the synagogue but chooses to hold a minyan at home without any compulsion. Moreover, even if the proclamation included those unable to attend the synagogue, one is not obligated to heed it, since it would contradict the law of the Torah—so how could he be liable for a fine?

Regarding one who transgresses multiple times, it is likewise clear that he is liable only once for the fine, even if he violated it many times, since the proclamation did not specify liability for each occurrence, nor was he warned in between.